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## CONTENTS

IAC-D-101	Intelligence Requirements on U. S. Citizens Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries (24 Jan 1956)
IAC-D-101/1	Intelligence Requirements on U. S. Citizens Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries (Memo setting up Meeting) (9 Feb 1956)
IAC-D-101/2	Intelligence Requirements on US Citizens Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries (21 Feb 1956)
IAC-D-101/3	Intelligence Requirements on US Citizens Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries (14 Mar 1956)
IAC-D-101/4	Report of Ad Hoc Prisoners Information Support Committee (23 April 1957)
IAC-D-102	Membership Lists - IAC and IAC Subcommittees (6 Feb 1956)

DOE review completed.

State Dept. review completed

Army Review  
Completed

DPMO review  
completed.

**SECRET**

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CONTENTS

IAC-D-104	Handbook of IAC Standing Subcommittees
(See Separate	(15 April 1957) (See Separate Folder)
Folder)	

IAC-D-105	Review of National Security Council Intelligence
(See Separate	Directives
Folder)	

**Page Denied**

## CONTENTS

IAC-D-106	Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used in Support of NSC Policy Papers, January-March 1957 (26 Apr 1957) (Limited Distribution)
IAC-D-106/1	Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used in Support of NSC Policy Papers, April-June 1957 (25 July 1957) (Limited Distribution)
IAC-D-106/2	Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used in Support of NSC Policy Papers, July-September 1957 (10 Oct 1957) (Limited Distribution)
IAC-D-106/3	Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used in Support of NSC Policy Papers, October-December 1957 (3 Jan 1958) ( Limited Distribution)
IAC-D-106/4	Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used in Support of NSC Policy Papers, January-March 1958 (12 May 1958) (Limited Distribution)
IAC-D-106/5	Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used in Support of NSC Policy Papers, April-June 1958 (15 July 1958) (Limited Distribution)

CONTENTS

IAC-D-107      National Policy on Counterintelligence and the  
Establishment of a Committee to Implement  
such Policy (5 June 1957) (Limited Distribution)

IAC-D-107

5 June 1957

Limited Distribution

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

National Policy on Counterintelligence and the Establishment  
of a Committee to Implement such Policy

Attached for your information is a copy of the memorandum on the above subject, which was discussed at the IAC meeting on 4 June, and subsequently forwarded in this form by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council.



JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington 25, D. C.

Office of the Director

4 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT : National Policy on Counterintelligence and  
the Establishment of a Committee to  
Implement such Policy

1. I desire to acknowledge your memorandum of 1 May 1957, entitled "National Policy on Counterintelligence and the Establishment of a Committee to Implement such Policy," with which was enclosed a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, entitled as above, dated 25 April 1957.

2. The Secretary of Defense proposes the organization of a new committee of nine charter members together with an NSC observer and Ad Hoc members as appropriate, with a permanent working staff to determine foreign counterintelligence policies and plans. This committee, according to the proposal, is to concern itself chiefly with the policy aspects of counterintelligence and security, with particular reference to "overseas activities and operations and to counterintelligence relations with international and foreign national counterintelligence organizations."

3. I concur in the view expressed by the Secretary of Defense that our security requires the most effective utilization of all United States counterintelligence capabilities. The protection of important American overseas military installations and personnel requires that we exercise the utmost vigilance and coordinate our actions to provide against espionage and infiltration by a potential enemy.

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4. The objectives sought can, I believe, be more rapidly and efficiently achieved by using existing machinery for the task rather than by creating still another interdepartmental committee and staff.

5. Counterintelligence or counterespionage is a segment of intelligence operations. It is impossible properly to counter a potential enemy's action without positive intelligence as to his intentions, capabilities and techniques. In the Intelligence Advisory Committee we now have a coordinating mechanism in the foreign intelligence field. To strip that Committee of its jurisdiction over foreign counterintelligence and to form a new body for this purpose, would create unnecessary and confusing duplication. If the new committee, as is apparently contemplated, should undertake to enter into relations with intelligence and security services abroad, parallel with the relationships which have been maintained with these services for many years, it would prejudice existing foreign intelligence liaison activities. Such relationships are not susceptible of committee management.

6. Membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with two exceptions, is practically identical with that proposed for the new committee. Elements of the Department of Defense are represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee by the Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Except for the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force, these are also responsible for the direction of counterintelligence matters in their respective Departments. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense is not normally represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force could be invited to join with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever counterintelligence policies and operational coordination matters are under consideration.

7. If the Secretary of Defense considers that the present charter of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is not adequate for the purposes he has in mind, I should be glad to receive and submit to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for its consideration any proposed amendments to the present directives. I am confident that the foregoing procedure would accomplish the Secretary of Defense's objectives in the most expeditious, efficient, economical and secure manner.



8. I am submitting this report in my capacity as Director of Central Intelligence and not as Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. It would seem to be the appropriate procedure in a matter of this nature, affecting the entire structure of intelligence coordination, for proposals to be considered by the Intelligence Advisory Committee before, not after, their formalization and submission to the National Security Council.

/s/  
ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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IAC-D-106/5  
15 July 1958  
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used

in Support of NSC Policy Papers

April-June 1958

The attached quarterly report, covering the period April-June 1958, is forwarded for information.

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JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary

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IAC-D-106/4  
12 May 1958  
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I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used

in Support of NSC Policy Papers

January-March 1958

The attached quarterly report, covering the period January-March 1958, is forwarded for information.

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JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary

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IAC-D-106/3  
3 January 1958  
Limited Distribution

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used

in Support of NSC Policy Papers

October-December 1957

The attached quarterly report, covering the period October-December 1957, is forwarded for information.

JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary

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IAC-D-106/2  
10 October 1957  
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used

in Support of NSC Policy Papers

July-September 1957

The attached quarterly report, covering the period July-September 1957, is forwarded for information.

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JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary

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IAC-D-106/1  
25 July 1957  
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I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used

in Support of NSC Policy Papers

April-June 1957

The attached quarterly report, covering the period April-June 1957, is forwarded for information.



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JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary

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26 April 1957  
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I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Quarterly Report of National Intelligence Estimates Used

in Support of NSC Policy Papers

January-March 1957

The attached quarterly report, covering the period January-March 1957, is forwarded for information.

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JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary

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IAC-D-102  
6 February 1956

# INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

## Membership Lists

### IAC and IAC Subcommittees

Attached for information is a roster of the IAC, its standing and ad hoc subcommittees.

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Secretary

*In addition to regular "D" distribution, the IAC Subcommittees received the following number of copies:*

ACOF LP	-	15	SEC-	15
DEC	-	12	Watch	
EDIC	-	15	Committee	10
EIC	-	35		
GMIC	-	15		
IDC	-	10		
IPC	-	10		
ICC	-	15		
IAEIC	-	10		
NISC	-	3		
RIC	-	10		

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IAC-D-102  
6 February 1956

## INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

### Chairman

Mr. Allen W. Dulles  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
221 Administration Building\*



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### Members

Mr. W. Park Armstrong  
Special Assistant, Intelligence  
Department of State  
1158 New State

Code 191  
Ext. 2132

Major General Ridgely Gaither  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
2E464 The Pentagon

Code 131  
Ext. 53033

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe  
Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy  
5C572 The Pentagon

Code 131  
Ext. 53239

Major General John A. Samford  
Director of Intelligence  
Headquarters, United States Air Force  
4A932 The Pentagon

Code 131  
Ext. 55613

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
The Joint Staff  
2E966 The Pentagon

Code 131  
Ext. 72921

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IAC-D-102  
6 February 1956

Mr. Harry S. Traynor  
Assistant General Manager  
Atomic Energy Commission  
338 Atomic Energy Commission


Code 144  
Ext. 8136

Mr. Alan Belmont  
Assistant Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
1742 Department of Justice

Code 175  
Ext. 2121

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Secretary

  
Deputy Assistant Director for  
National Estimates  
Central Intelligence Agency  
101 Administration Building

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\*Official correspondence to the Chairman should be  
directed to the Secretary.

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IAC-D-102  
6 February 1956

## INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

### Subcommittees of the IAC

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#### Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications

Chairman

[redacted]  
353 Administration Bldg.  
Central Intelligence Agency

#### Domestic Exploitation Committee

Chairman

Mr. Edwin M. Ashcraft, III  
1520 Quarters I  
Central Intelligence Agency

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Secretary

[redacted]  
1520 Quarters I  
Central Intelligence Agency

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#### Economic Defense Intelligence Committee

Chairman

Mr. Maurice J. Williams  
1001 [redacted]  
Central Intelligence Agency

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Vice Chairman

[redacted]  
205 Central Bldg.  
Central Intelligence Agency

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Acting Executive Sec'y

[redacted]  
210 Central Bldg.  
Central Intelligence Agency

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6 February 1956

Economic Intelligence Committee

Chairman	Dr. Otto E. Guthe 1109 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Vice Chairman	Mr. Maurice J. Williams 1001 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Executive Secretary	Dr. Omar B. Pancoast, Jr. 1001 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

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Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

Chairman	Lt. Col. George Wilson 4B934, The Pentagon Department of the Air Force	Code 131 Ext. 75717
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Secretary	[redacted] 2313 Barton Hall Central Intelligence Agency
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Interagency Defector Committee

Chairman	[redacted] 1062 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
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Secretary	[redacted] 1062 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
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Interagency Priorities Committee

Chairman	[redacted] 1067 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
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Secretary	[redacted] 2703 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
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IAC-D-102

6 February 1956

International Communism Committee

Chairman	Mr. Jack Lydman 600 State Annex 1 Department of State	Code 191 Ext. 3112
Secretary	Mr. Bernard Morris 406 State Annex 1 Department of State	Code 191 Ext. 5426

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

Chairman	Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr. 145 Barton Hall Central Intelligence Agency
Alternate Chairman	Dr. Frank A. Valente 1805 Barton Hall Central Intelligence Agency
Secretary	Lt. Col. Glen A. Smith 1805 Barton Hall Central Intelligence Agency

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National Intelligence Survey Committee

Chairman	Captain Kenneth A. Knowles [Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Vice Chairman	Colonel R. H. Boberg [Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Acting Secretary	[Redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

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Resistance Intelligence Committee

Chairman	Mr. Boris Klosson 502 State Annex 1 Department of State	Code 191 Ext. 4547
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IAC-D-102  
6 February 1956

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Scientific Estimates Committee

Chairman

145 Barton Hall  
Central Intelligence Agency

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Alternate Chairman

1501 Barton Hall  
Central Intelligence Agency

25X1

Secretary

2513 Barton Hall  
Central Intelligence Agency

25X1

Watch Committee

Chairman

General Charles P. Cabell  
203 Administration Bldg.  
Central Intelligence Agency

Director, NIC

Mr. J. J. Hitchcock  
BC956, The Pentagon

Code 131  
Ext. 77498

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IAC-D-102  
6 February 1956

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Ad Hoc Subcommittees of the IAC

Task Force on Inspection

Chairman

2111

Central Intelligence Agency

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Meteorological Intelligence Committee

Chairman

2701 Barton Hall

Central Intelligence Agency

25X1

Secretary

229 Barton Hall

Central Intelligence Agency

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Information Processing Committee

Chairman

Mr. J. W. Moreau

1033

Central Intelligence Agency

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Secretary

350-26th St.

Central Intelligence Agency

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American-Soviet Exchange of Visits Program

Chairman

Mr. William Bundy

348 Administration Bldg.

Central Intelligence Agency

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IAC-D-101/4  
23 April 1957

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

**Report of Ad Hoc Prisoners Information Support Committee**

**References:** IAC-D-101; IAC-D-101/1; IAC-D-101/2;  
IAC-D-101/3; IAC-M-235, item 3

The attached report by the Ad Hoc Prisoners Information Support Committee will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for noting and appropriate action with respect to the recommendations of the Committee.



**JOHN HEIRES**  
Secretary

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IAC-D-101/4  
23 April 1957

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington 25, D. C.

April 16, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. John Heires  
Executive Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Transmission of Report

Forwarded herewith is report on the activities of the ad hoc subcommittee created by the IAC in April 1956 for the purpose of studying the need for an organization to accomplish the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence in support of activities directed toward recovery of U. S. nationals held in Communist countries.

The report has the concurrence of all members of the ad hoc subcommittee.

/s/  
W. H. GODEL  
Deputy Assistant to the  
Secretary of Defense  
(Special Operations)

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Report

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IAC-D-101/4  
23 April 1957

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP  
TO STUDY THE NEED FOR AN ORGANIZATION TO ACCOMPLISH  
THE COLLECTION, EVALUATION AND DISSEMINATION OF  
INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARD  
RECOVERY OF U. S. NATIONALS HELD IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

SECTION I, BACKGROUND

1. In November 1955 the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (SO) by memorandum to the JCS requested a special study by the Joint Intelligence Group of:

a. Intelligence requirements for an effective prisoner identification and repatriation program.

b. Requirements for the necessary organization to accomplish the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence in support of activities directed toward recovery of U. S. nationals held.

In response to this request the JIC approved a study of the problem which among other actions caused the JCS representative to the IAC to submit this matter to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for consideration. It was pointed out that this action would bring to the attention of the Intelligence Community as a whole the need for intensified effort on the part of intelligence agencies in support of operations for recovery or repatriation.

2. Based upon a separate and immediate need for intelligence regarding unaccounted-for prisoners of war from the Korean War, a separate memorandum to the JCS in January 1956 requested:

a. Such additional collation of existing information held by the military departments concerning missing prisoners as is necessary to put it in the most useful and meaningful form for U. S. negotiators.

b. Review and revision as necessary of existing EEI's concerning missing prisoners in order to provide appropriate identification materials to intelligence collection agencies.

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IAC-D-101/4  
23 April 1957

c. An optimum interchange of missing prisoners information between the military departments.

d. Collection of information on missing prisoners from possible sources outside of the military

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3. Action on this latter request of January 1956 was held up pending a reply from the IAC as to its action in response to the January memorandum forwarded to the IAC by the JCS representative.

4. In February of 1956, the IAC requested the State and Defense Prisoner Officers (a two-man committee formed earlier to monitor activities in the repatriation field) to elaborate on their analysis of the existing problem and their recommendations as to corrective actions.

5. On 2 March 1956 the State and Defense Prisoner Officers provided a memorandum for the Chairman, IAC, which recommended that the following arrangements be made within the Intelligence Community.

a. Determine which agencies of the U. S. Government, both within and outside of the Intelligence Community, are capable of contributing substantially to the collection of intelligence pertaining to Americans believed held in Communist countries.

b. Insure that all available intelligence resources are utilized to locate and identify U. S. nationals held in Communist prisons and to collect and disseminate pertinent information to the Department of State in the cases of U. S. civilians, to the Department of Defense in the cases of United States military personnel, or both to both of these Departments when it is not known whether the individual is civilian or military.

c. Provide for the establishment of an interviewing guide containing instructions for the collection of this type of intelligence, with a supplement containing photographs,

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IAC-D-101/4

23 April 1957

vital statistics and pertinent biographical material about personnel possibly held and the history of their disappearance or capture. This collection guide and supplement should be reproduced in legible and compact form and made available to all field collection agencies. The guide supplement should permit more pointed and accurate reporting from the field and facilitate feed-back from time to time of intelligence available within the Washington area. In addition the guide supplement would provide essential background material for use in negotiations.

d. To insure that effective procedures exist within the intelligence community for evaluating and collating information collected to insure accomplishment of b. and c. above.

6. In April 1956 the item was considered in the meeting of the IAC. The IAC approved the recommendations of the two Prisoner Officers and agreed to the establishment of an ad hoc working group to cope with the problems identified by the Prisoner Officers. The Department of Defense provided the Chairman for the working group. In addition, the Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force, and State, the JCS, the CIA, the FBI and the AEC were represented on the working group.

7. In the meantime, in order to fulfill the requirement set forth in paragraph 2 above, which was generated by Department of State plans to enter into direct negotiations at Geneva with Chinese Communist officials for an accounting on unaccounted-for U. S. personnel held by the Chinese Communists, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), in May 1956, requested the military services to provide full documentation in each case (450) covering the unaccounted-for military personnel from the Korean War. The military services had all responded to this request by 1 July 1956 and the materials were turned over to the Department of State for use by the U. S. Negotiator at Geneva (U. Alexis Johnson).

8. Because of the gaps in this material furnished by the military services and their consequent inadequacy, the services were directed by the Secretary of Defense on October 27, 1956 to initiate a program to

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IAC-D-101/4

23 April 1957

screen exhaustively all files and records on each case in order to provide as completely as possible the identification data about each person, a complete account of the circumstances surrounding his capture or disappearance, and any evidence which would demonstrate when and where the individual was in the hands of the Communists. A suggested EEI (see Annex "A" attached) was furnished to the Services as a guide, and they were directed to make an initial report not later than December 1956 and quarterly thereafter until further notice.

9. This directed action has resulted in the production to date, and forwarding to the Department of State for further forwarding to Ambassador Johnson of detailed dossiers on 53 Army personnel and 9 Navy personnel (including Marine Corps). The Department of the Air Force is carrying out a similar survey but has not yet furnished additional data beyond that furnished in mid-1956 which, however, was in considerably more detail than that furnished by the other services at that time.

## SECTION II, CURRENT STATUS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ESTABLISHED IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IAC

10. The Chairman of the working group left the Department of Defense (Air Force Staff) in January 1957 and a new Chairman has not been designated.

11. The committee has not met since July 1, 1956.

12. The committee is still officially in existence, not having been dissolved or discharged by the IAC.

## SECTION III, CONCLUSIONS

13. Within the Department of Defense, efforts to collect, collate, and disseminate all available intelligence and information on missing or unaccounted-for military personnel appears to be progressing satisfactorily.

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IAC-D-101/4  
23 April 1957

14. The residual problem appears to center around taking steps to insure that all agencies responsible for determining the status of U. S. personnel missing and unaccounted-for formulate their intelligence collection requirements in this area, and that the results of subsequent collection and collation efforts be made available to the Departments of State and Defense, the departments of primary responsibility in recovery and repatriation operations.

#### SECTION IV, RECOMMENDATIONS

15. That the Ad Hoc Working Group (Sec. II) be dissolved.

16. That the IAC member agencies recommend to offices within those agencies which are responsible for determining the status of U. S. personnel held, now or in the future by Communist countries, or bearing on otherwise accounting for missing personnel, as follows:

a. Review of intelligence collection requirements related to such personnel actions.

b. Forwarding for IAC consideration such intelligence collection requirements in this area concerning which it is concluded that IAC action is appropriate.

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IAC-D-101/4

23 April 1957

**ANNEX "A"**

**SUGGESTIONS AS TO TYPES OF INFORMATION REQUIRED  
TO SUPPORT POW RECOVERY ACTIONS**

**IDENTIFYING DATA:**

Name, Rank, Service Number:  
Date, Place of Birth:  
Photograph (where possible)  
Distinguishing marks and characteristics:

**CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE AND/OR DISAPPEARANCE:**

Time and place of contact with enemy:  
Description of engagement in locality:  
Testimony of witnesses to capture, wounds, or abandonment:

**EVIDENCE OF CAPTURE:**

Testimony in affidavit form of witnesses who saw or  
heard of individual as a prisoner, giving times,  
places and circumstances.  
Transcripts of communist radio and press admissions  
concerning the individual.  
Photostats of International Red Cross communications  
pertaining to individual.  
Other data which will support the U. S. charge that the  
Communists have some knowledge about the individual.

**INTELLIGENCE REPORTS:**

Extracts from intelligence reports which are relevant to  
the individual case.  
References to each Specific Request for Intelligence  
pertaining to each case.

**INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AS TO:**

Whether the individual is alive and held:  
Where being held:  
What exploitation of the individual by the Communists is  
to be expected:

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IAC-D-101/3  
14 March 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Intelligence Requirements on U. S. Citizens

Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries

1. Attached is the joint report of the State Prisoner Officer and the Defense Prisoner Officer prepared in response to IAC request for clarification of requirements (IAC-D-101/2, para. 4). See also IAC-D-101 and 101/1.
2. This will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for discussion.



Secretary

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IAC-D-101/3  
14 March 1956

March 2, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Recommendations for Improving Collection  
of Intelligence on Americans Held in  
Communist Countries

Nature of the Problem

1. The United States Government and the American people traditionally have felt deep concern at the unjust detention of American citizens in foreign countries. The Government is obligated to take every possible step to procure the release of such citizens. The imprisonment of Americans in Communist countries presents a new and unusual problem in this field because of the exceptional difficulty of obtaining accurate intelligence.

2. In negotiating for release of prisoners held or believed held by Communist countries, it has become increasingly apparent that improved intelligence is an essential base for effective action to recover personnel. The Communists have demonstrated again and again that unless the United States can identify the subject of negotiation and provide evidence that he is being held by the Communists, there is little chance of effecting his release.

3. The intelligence available to support these recovery activities has usually been collected as a by-product of other intelligence. The material provided the negotiators has been compiled by persons outside the intelligence community who have little appreciation of the task of negotiating face to face with the Communists.

4. Most intelligence reports have been lacking in detail and specificity. General lack of emphasis on this problem has resulted in reporting of isolated bits of information which have not been correlated with existing intelligence. The reports reflect the shortage of background information in the hands of the field collectors.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IAC-D-101/3  
14 March 1956

5. While there are indications of failure to cross-disseminate the reports available to all interested agencies, these problems of communication are rapidly being eliminated by improved liaison within the Government and by concentrated effort on the part of State and Defense Department personnel. However, there are certain areas that could benefit by further examination.

#### Examples of Particular Problems

6. In the negotiations being conducted in Geneva with the Chinese Communists by Ambassador Johnson, he has been severely handicapped in demanding an accounting for 450 American servicemen missing from the Korean war because the records on these men are inadequate. He has been unable to cite specific, convincing facts in individual cases to demonstrate that the Communists should have knowledge of the fate of these persons. One important reason for the inadequacy of the information is the fact that neither the original collectors of the intelligence nor the persons who compiled the records for use in Geneva were properly instructed as to the type of intelligence to be collected and the use to which it was to be put.

7. Many agencies are currently engaged in interrogating German prisoners returning from Soviet prison camps. The interrogators are handicapped in exploiting this excellent source of intelligence on Americans held in the USSR because they lack proper guidance and background material on missing persons.

#### Recommendations

8. It is recommended that arrangements be made in the intelligence community:

(a) to determine which agencies of the United States Government, both within and outside of the intelligence community, are capable of contributing substantially to the collection of intelligence of Americans believed held in Communist countries;

(b) to ensure that all available intelligence resources are utilized to locate and identify United States nationals held in Communist prisons and to collect and disseminate pertinent

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IAC-D-101/3  
14 March 1956

information to the Department of State in the cases of United States civilians, the Department of Defense in the cases of United States military personnel, or to both these departments when it is not known whether the individual is civilian or military;

(c) to provide for the establishment of an interviewing guide containing instructions for the collection of this type of intelligence, with a supplement containing photographs, vital statistics, and pertinent biographical material about personnel possibly held, and history of their disappearance or capture. This collection guide and supplement should be reproduced in legible and compact form and made available to all field collection agencies. The guide supplement should enable more pointed and accurate reporting from the field and facilitate feedback from time to time of intelligence available within the Washington area to field agencies. In addition the guide supplement would provide essential background material for use in negotiation;

(d) to ensure that effective procedures exist within the intelligence community for evaluating and collating information collected to insure the accomplishment of b) and c) above. (Without proper evaluation in the past, information pertaining to personnel not readily identified was not made available to the appropriate agencies.)

/s/ Ralph N. Clough  
Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs  
Department of State Prisoner Officer

/s/ James L. Monroe  
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF,  
Department of Defense Prisoner Officer

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IAC-D-101/2  
21 February 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Intelligence Requirements on US Citizens

Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries

1. On 15 February, IAC representatives and interested State and Defense personnel met with the Secretary to discuss the Joint Staff request that the IAC consider steps which would aid the US to determine the status or the recovery of missing persons held in Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.
2. The immediate problem, reduced to its essentials, is to get to the State Department Prisoner Officer and to the Defense Department Prisoner Officer, who are the responsible action officers, information from any and all sources on specific individuals, which when assembled and analyzed could lead to the determination of their status.
3. It was agreed that little can be done by the intelligence community until precise requirements are drawn up by the State and Defense action officers.
4. Therefore, pending further IAC action, the State Department Prisoner Officer and the Defense Department Prisoner Officer are being requested to draw up jointly a statement of their:
  - a. Requirements for the dissemination and exchange of intelligence;
  - b. General requirements for information; and,
  - c. Special requirements for information (specific individuals or information peculiar to particular areas).

  
Secretary

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
IAC-D-101/1  
9 February 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Intelligence Requirements on US Citizens

Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries

1. On 24 January, I circulated the memorandum of the Joint Staff member which requested IAC action to satisfy the intelligence requirement considered vital to the determination of the status or the recovery of missing persons.
2. Preliminary consultation with individual departments has not made clear precisely what can or should be done over and above present efforts. Short of having a specific recommendation on which it could act, it is premature to place this matter before the IAC.
3. I therefore suggest that representatives from the IAC agencies meet to get a clarification of the problem from the Joint Staff representative and to discuss what specific action could be recommended to the IAC.
4. Representatives may wish to be accompanied by interested officers within their respective departments who are not in the intelligence community (e. g., The Joint Staff may wish to invite the Department of Defense Prisoner Officer; the Navy may wish to have the Marine Corps represented; and State may wish to have the State Prisoner Officer).
5. The meeting will be held at 2:00 p. m. Wednesday, 15 February, in Room 115, Administration Building, Central Intelligence Agency.

  
Secretary

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IAC-D-101  
24 January 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Intelligence Requirements on U. S. Citizens

Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries

The attached memorandum for the Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee, from the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, is circulated for information as a preliminary to IAC early consideration of appropriate action.



Secretary .

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IAC-D-101  
24 January 1956

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

DDIM-6-56  
11 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

Subject : Intelligence Requirements on U. S. Citizens  
Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries

1. In a memorandum, dated 21 November 1955, addressed to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) requested the Joint Intelligence Committee to "make a study of the intelligence requirements for an effective prisoner identification and repatriation program and make recommendations for its adoption."

2. The results of this study indicate certain intelligence collection and production requirements which should be satisfied. The study addressed itself primarily to the consideration of unaccounted for prisoners of war and other missing people who are residuals after all normal accounting processes, prisoner exchanges and the like have been completed. The military personnel in this category remain in a missing status for a period of one year after which, by virtue of Public Law 490, 77th Congress (Missing Persons Act), they are declared "missing and presumed dead", benefits are paid to their survivors and for all practical intents and purposes their cases are closed. The intent of the law, undoubtedly, is to relieve hardship on the survivors and the process should be continued. However, there should be no relaxation of effort, by virtue of that law, in determining the final status of these individuals, removing all "presumptions", recovering them if still alive or otherwise making final disposition of each individual case.

3. There is a requirement at this time for a coordinated and continuous effort to collect all available information and to produce intelligence on missing persons. Such an effort is

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IAC-D-101  
24 January 1956

considered mandatory and will form the basis for recovery efforts by the appropriate U.S. action agencies. This effort is in keeping with the best American traditions which have always placed a high value on the welfare of individuals. The machinery to accomplish this task already exists. Some of this machinery is operating to this end now in unilateral efforts, e.g., individual military Service efforts to trace their missing people resulting from the Korean incident after the conclusion of "Operation Big Switch". However, it is considered necessary to coordinate and intensify these efforts.

4. Enclosed herewith (Annex hereto) is a tabular display of missing U. S. Nationals who are unaccounted for as of 1 December 1955. As you will note, the majority of these people are a responsibility for accounting purposes of the Chinese Communists. The 1 December 1955 total of 518 missing persons represents a reduction of 426 from the 1953 total of 944. This reduction was accomplished primarily by our own efforts with little or no cooperation from the Sino-Soviet Bloc nations.

5. It is recommended that this matter be placed before the Intelligence Advisory Committee for consideration, as a matter of priority, and that action be taken to satisfy this important intelligence requirement which is considered to be vital to the determination of the status of these missing persons and for their recovery if alive.

/s/ ROBERT TOTTEN  
Colonel, USAF  
Acting Deputy Director  
for Intelligence  
The Joint Staff

IAC-D-101  
24 January 1956

ANNEX

STATISTICAL BREAKDOWN OF MISSING PERSONS

	<u>Communist China</u>	<u>USSR &amp; Eur. Sats.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Civilians	14	1	15
Army	244	10	254
Navy	3	10	13
Air Force	190	33	223
Marine Corps	13	-	13
Coast Guard	-	-	-
	<hr/> 464	<hr/> 54	<hr/> 518

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